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In humor studies, the following quotation from Arthur Schopenhauer is well known: “Laughter 
always arises from nothing other than a suddenly perceived lack of congruence between a concept 
and the real objects that are in some respect or other thought through it, and it is itself just the 
expression of this lack of congruence.”1 In this sense, what is congruous would be a percept that a 
perceiver expects to see or that which fits within his already established preconceptual framework 
through which one interprets the world. When inconsistencies are brought to consciousness, or in 
Schopenhauer’s sense, when we are surprised to find “two or more real objects [that] are thought 
through one concept,”2 the elements for humor are in place. Schopenhauer is arguing that if there is 
laughter then there must be the sorts of incongruity he discusses. It is not clear that he is saying the 
converse that if there is incongruity there must be laughter; this untenable view would imply that all 
incongruities are funny. But even with the more favorable interpretation, he does not explain what it 
is about the incongruity that leads to laughter. So, what could that be? 
It cannot merely be an unexpected break in a pattern, or a violation of some rule or 
conceptual model. Finding the severed head of your favorite racehorse in your bed is clearly 
incongruous, but hardly elicits mirth. Therefore, there must be something that allows us to 
distinguish between amusing incongruities and incongruities as such that might include “the 
grotesque, the macabre, the horrible, the bizarre, and the fantastic.”3 John Morreall argues that the 
non-humorous incongruities “lack the playfulness of amusement, in that they are emotionally 
engaged responses.”4 When we laugh at something we found humorous, we undergo a psychological 
and conceptual shift: “This change may be primarily cognitive, as the incongruity theory shows—
from a serious state of perceiving and thinking about things that fit into our conceptual patterns, to 
a nonserious state of being amused by some incongruity.”5 Schopenhauer fails to reveal what it is 
about the incongruity in operation that leads to mirth beyond noting the recognition that our reason 
is not infallible.6 Morreall’s additional feature of play mode related to free, creative thought, and his 
extended analysis of the sudden conceptual shift with the recognition of incongruity, provide more 
detail about the content of incongruity in addition to placing humorous incongruities within a 
distinct context from non-humorous dissonance.   
Morreall argues that the feeling of mirth arises from a sudden conceptual shift caused by the 
recognition of a non-threatening incongruity. If the psychological shift in response to an incongruity 
evokes an attitude that is practically engaged, there will be no pleasure, and thus no humor, or very 
little of either. The practical concern is usually expressed through emotions. He offers examples of 
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negative emotions such as “fear, pity, indignation, disgust, etc.” and neutral ones like “puzzlement, 
wonder, curiosity, or problem-solving,”7 as attitudes that will not provide pleasure sufficient for 
humor. The reason for this, Morreall argues, is that such emotional states gear one toward “urgent 
practical needs,”8 or as he puts it later, “[e]motions involve cognitive and practical engagement with 
what is going on around us. We are serious, focused on dangers and opportunities, and prepared to 
act to further our interests. What is happening matters to us. The mental framework is 
REAL/HERE/NOW/ME/PRACTICAL.”9 This attitude is in contrast to the humorous attitude 
that does not call for any adjustments to one’s environment or self; it is the play mode, which he 
opposes to a serious mode. However, this central distinction Morreall makes fails to take into 
account the ambiguities of seriousness and playfulness. One of the results of this is that he 
prematurely stalls investigation into some humor that can be used toward serious ends; humorists 
who are serious in their subversion of what the existentialists call a “spirit of seriousness.”10  
Consider Schopenhauer’s harsh treatment of the systematizing pedant (Kant?), which could 
also be a description of the existentialists’ spirit of seriousness described below: “Here then the 
incongruence between concepts and reality is soon shown, soon shown how the former never 
descend to the level of the individual, and how their generality and rigid determinateness can never 
exactly fit the subtle nuances and manifold modifications of actual reality.”11 Put into existentialist 
terms, there is a contrast between the static abstractions of universalizing systems of thought that are 
bound by presumed necessary laws, and the dynamic, plural, contingencies of lived experience. For 
Schopenhauer, we are foolish if we think our conceptual schemas can so easily and perfectly map 
onto reality, as if there were no incongruity. 
In The World as Will and Idea Volume II, Schopenhauer provides another connection between 
seriousness and humor: “The opposite of laughing and joking is seriousness. Accordingly, it consists in 
the consciousness of the perfect agreement and congruity of the conception, or thought, with what 
is perceived, or the reality. The serious man is convinced that he thinks the things as they are, and that they are as 
he thinks them.” 12  Notice this conception of seriousness is quite different from the common 
connotation of the term, which has as synonyms such words as grave, solemn, somber, severe, sober, stern, 
etc., to describe the person’s mental state. It is also distinct from Morreall’s conception of 
seriousness, which is not the existentialist connotation, as is revealed in the following description: 
“For us to be serious is to be solemn and given to sustained, narrowly focused thought. It is also for 
us to be earnest, that is, sincere, in what we say and do. We say only what we believe, and act only 
according to our real intentions.” 13  Aside from solemnity, all of the other elements Morreall 
presumes to be a part of seriousness are compatible with a humorist who is attacking the putatively 
necessary conventions and rules of society, e.g., but doing so indirectly. In this way, as I will describe 
more below with some of Morreall’s own examples, the humorist can be understood to be 
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…Indeed, this is an important part of the incongruity, as the audience must oscillate between the 
literal, bona-fide, and direct speech, and the intended meaning, or the “implicature.”14  
Compare existentialists Jean-Paul Sartre’s, Simone De Beauvoir’s, Jorge Portilla’s, and Lewis 
Gordon’s approaches to the spirit of seriousness in which the salient feature is the absolutist, 
dogmatic, and otherworldliness and/or unquestionable nature of the values and meanings held by 
serious people. Under this attitude, the serious person fails to recognize the dynamic, flexible, and 
contingent characteristics of human persons that challenge the idea that we have unchanging 
natures, some presumed to be “superior” to others. In addition, especially related to issues 
surrounding oppression, De Beauvoir adds “The slave is submissive when one has succeeded in 
mystifying him in such a way that his situation does not seem to him to be imposed by men, but to 
be immediately given by nature, by the gods, by the powers against whom revolt has no meaning.”15 
To be sure, one who holds fast to a world view takes it seriously in the sense that it is important to 
him, another common connotation of the term, but one who tenaciously sticks to a set of beliefs 
regardless of any counter-evidence, is serious in a different way than the familiar senses connote. 
The spirit of seriousness is an attitude that self-perpetuates mental inflexibility especially related to 
values and meanings connected to power and comfort. The cognitive ease that comes with 
(presumed) certainty can act in a reciprocal fashion by further entrenching one in seriousness. 
Graveness, soberness, etc., might accompany this sense of seriousness, but one can peel those 
common notions away from a serious man, and still be left with the opposite of humor.    
Morreall (1999) offers a taxonomy of the tragic vision of life, which I see as analogous to the 
sense of seriousness invoked by Schopenhauer and later existentialists. He distinguishes the comic 
and tragic world-views where the over-arching difference has to do with mental rigidity in 
seriousness as opposed to flexibility in humor. The serious (tragic) individuals engage life through 
simple conceptual schemes in terms of unquestioned absolutes that appeal to authority, tradition, 
and the comforts of the status quo. We see the motivation for complacency, ease, and purity of 
thought about oneself, the world, and especially other people. Here, Morreall does seem to have the 
right notion of seriousness in contrast to humor. 
This tragic attitude parallels the presumptions of serious people who are inclined toward 
what Lewis Gordon calls “epistemic closure” in the context of making judgments about groups of 
people: “In the act of epistemic closure, one ends a process of inquiry. In effect, it is the judgment 
‘say no more’…In contrast, epistemological openness is the judgment ‘there is always more to be 
known.’”16 This outlook shuns ambiguity and vagueness in the drive for simplicity, dividing reality 
into neat and tidy essential categories: “[m]ost thinking in tragedy is what psychologists call 
convergent thinking… In this mode, there is no room for making unusual connections between 
ideas.” 17  The “rigid determinateness” Schopenhauer sees in the pedant’s theoretical, universal, 
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abstract thinking can also be found in the serious person’s clinging to the “accuracy” of certain 
stereotypes, e.g., which sustain a comfortable narrative for that person.  
The mental inelasticity combined with power and a society that privileges those who already 
have power creates and perpetuates the sort of seriousness which I wish to contrast with humor; in 
particular, subversive humor. This sort of humor has as one of its goals the subversion of an unjust 
status quo. For such a disruption to be successful, different possible perspectives on reality need to 
be made available, and this requires, on the part of the humorist and audience, an ability and 
inclination to cognitive shifting so that incongruity can be recognized rather than ignored. In order 
to do this (non-existentially) serious work through humor, one must be capable of playing and 
encouraging others to adopt a similarly playful mode of discourse/interaction. One effective way to 
do this is to create and/or highlight incongruities in such a way that others will want to play with the 
seemingly incoherent thoughts, and possibly discover a hidden meaning within the ludicrous. 
 
Incongruity and Playfulness 
 
What can be pleasurable about incongruity? Most of the conceptions of incongruity involve some 
element of confusion, tension, doubt, disagreement, or some kind of discord, all of which can be, as 
Kant argues, quite displeasing to the understanding. Thus, a consideration of the mental states of the 
audience in addition to the content of the humor is required, as Morreall claims, “[t]here is nothing 
objectively incongruous or comic about the universe or the human condition, then, and so 
amusement is possible only for those who are ignorant and confused.”18 Ignorance and confusion 
sound unpleasant and indeed people in either mental state have often been the butt of humorists. 
But such mental states can lead to enjoyment or even be enjoyable in themselves for one who is in 
play mode. Within the framework of a playful attitude, these otherwise negative mental states can be 
co-opted19 to aid in philosophical investigation specifically, but awareness and interest in the world 
generally. On the other hand, for those who desire to alleviate the discomfort felt in the realization 
of a tension between one’s beliefs and perceptions immediately, or expectations and reality, there are 
fewer openings to live an examined life and one is in a sense trapped in seriousness. 
For Morreall, playfulness or play mode is an attitude about the world, but it is not the default 
mode;20 it is something that one has to cultivate and hone much like an appreciation of aesthetics in 
general, or the taste for beer. This is exemplified in what he calls the “comic vision of life.” Within 
this attitude, “[w]e can be playful in several senses, each opposed to a sense of ‘serious.’ First, we can 
be not-grave, not engaged in deep, narrowly focused thought. Second, we can be not-sincere in what 
we say and do. As a joke, we can engage in non-bona fide communication and activity…When we 
are serious, we are usually in a practical frame of mind in which we want to achieve some goal. We 
are working toward something, and anything playful would be a distraction.”21 Morreall also includes a 
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third interesting connection between the ways we “play” rather than “work” music, e.g., noting that 
life in general is something better played rather than worked in serious mode. This is so even though 
he claims “[m]ost humor … has always been about problems.”22  
A playful attitude inclines one toward using the feelings of doubt and confusion, which are 
inevitable in an uncertain, surprising, and often baffling world. When in play mode, one is more 
open to the complexities of reality, not only cognizant of disorder, the unfamiliar, ambiguity, 
incongruity, but predisposed to enjoy the mental tension that results from these dissonances, as these 
disruptions of expectations are helpful in opening avenues for creative thinking. By “creative” here, 
I simply mean one’s thought is free from the constraints imposed by others.  
Creative thinking cultivated by playfulness could include free playtime during school recess, 
e.g., in which children engage in imaginative play rather than “organized” sport in which the rules 
and goals have been preset by others (often humorless overly-competitive adults).23 In this way, a spirit 
of playfulness is opposed to the existentialist spirit of seriousness in addition to Morreall’s 
conception of seriousness. For instance, De Beauvoir considers the playfulness of a child thrown into 
a world of ready-made values, but where “he is allowed to play, to expend his existence freely. In 
this child’s circle he feels that he can passionately pursue and joyfully attain goals which he has set 
up for himself.”24  
A related point is that creative play also promotes mental freedom, as the French 
philosopher Penjon claims, laughter is “freedom from the strict laws of rational thinking and 
freedom to play with new ideas.”25 Of course, many of these “laws” are the sorts Schopenhauer 
bemoans that are constructed by a priori theorists. Under the umbrella concept “incongruity,” we can 
see some of the benefits of a humorous attitude. The feeling of mirth, like that experienced in play 
generally, is desirable in itself. But humor, like play, is also instrumentally valuable. There is a 
reciprocal relationship between incongruities that encourage playfulness, and a playful attitude that 
places one in the appropriate cognitive distance to first recognize, then understand, and then enjoy 
the incongruity. They build upon each other, and no one, not even the most serious of the 
existentially serious, is wholly incapable of recognizing and enjoying humor.26    
So, not only can incongruity be pleasurable in play mode, akin to an aesthetic experience 
where “incongruity is enjoyed for its own sake,” 27  the amusement we experience in detecting 
incongruities habituates us to be on the lookout for more of them in a variety of contexts; this is in 
effect intellectual training in preparation for confronting an uncertain world. This provides the wit 
with a unique opportunity to open the minds of otherwise serious people by triggering their play 
mode. In doing so, both the wit and the audience can enjoy incongruity and possibly see a socio-
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The Ambiguities of Seriousness and Playfulness 
 
In Morreall’s latest book, he devotes an entire chapter to “The Negative Ethics of Humor.” 28 
However, this analysis of humor remains almost Machiavellian in its advice narrowly tailored to the 
socially privileged as to when laughing is acceptable and when it is not. Morreall does show concern 
about oppressive jokes and analyzes what might be wrong with them;29 in addition, he considers why 
black people, women, and homosexuals, e.g., do not laugh at jokes that harm them. However, 
Morreall’s account of playfulness and seriousness has the unintended consequence of both 
exonerating oppressors and undermining the efficacy of subversive humorists. This is due to the 
level of emotional and cognitive disengagement in his sense of play mode. 
Morreall is too insistent that one of the advantages of humor lies in total cognitive and 
emotional disengagement.30 When taken as far as he does this at the very least turns into the vice of 
apathy. This emotional distance can cultivate a number of intellectual and moral virtues, but when 
the disengagement is the sort advocated by Morreall, there is a doubly negative consequence: since 
purveyors of oppressive jokes have no intention of doing harm, as they are “just playing” with no 
designs to actually convey genuine or “bona-fide” information, they are guilty of little more than 
revealing an “indifference to the truth.”31 At the same time it further degrades the power of the 
oppressed who do choose to engage their situation with a humorous attitude--they too are “just 
playing” as they are not taking seriously (in Morreall’s sense) the content of their own jokes, and 
thus they need not be taken seriously in any sense. Therefore, Morreall at once absolves oppressors 
who use ridicule, for example,32 and undermines marginalized peoples’ use of subversive humor as 
mere frivolity, intending only to stimulate glee: “the creator of humor puts ideas into our heads not 
to communicate information, but for the delight those ideas will bring.”33 
This non-serious attitude in Morreall’s sense, when applied to oppressor or oppressed in 
humor, can actually be seen as an adoption of seriousness in the existentialist sense. Rather than 
standing as a confrontation to a legitimate problem, the laughter from the oppressed acts merely as 
an exercise of fictionalizing and/or aestheticizing what would otherwise be viewed as a crippling 
state of affairs. Seen in this light, the humor acts not as a subversive tactic, but rather as another 
mechanism of self-constraint, for the laughers are not really interested in changing anything, but 
merely experiencing the temporary relief that comes from tension-releasing laughter; they are 
revealing that they are content, even at ease with the way things are even though the play mode 
enables them to recognize the disparity between that reality and how things should be.34 This is not an 
espousal of Stoicism per se, in which one seeks the wisdom to distinguish between that which can 
be controlled and that which is beyond anyone’s power. Morreall has many valuable things to say 
about laughter in the face of the latter, where I think a connection can be made between his “comic 
pragmatism” 35  and an existentialist brand of humor. 36  However, to confuse the latter with the 
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former is to adopt a spirit of seriousness: since nothing can be done about systemic oppression any 
more than we can elude death, “Why bother?” Why not just laugh?37 Nevertheless, I do not think 
this is what occurs when subversive humor, at least, is invoked.   
There seem to be three distinct meanings of “seriousness” in opposition to “playfulness” 
relevant to this discussion: (1) the existential sense and Schopenhauer’s description above; (2) 
Morreall’s solemn or grave sense in which one has immediate practical concerns revealed in the literal 
use of bona-fide language and emotional engagement; and (3) the practical concern for that which is 
important to an individual; I take something seriously because it matters to me. This kind of mattering 
does not entail a hyper-emotional attachment to some state of affairs such that one is in a sense 
trapped in her reptilian brain, for example, where only fight or flight type responses are available. 
However, it is also not a mental state wholly devoid of emotion, as such a mental state would not 
(could not) elicit any interest, much less concern, for the individual. 38 It is this third sense of 
seriousness that is distinct from both the existentialist connotation and Morreall’s seriousness-as-
graveness that is combined with playfulness in subversive humor that uses incongruities as a means 
to unsettle an unjust status quo. 
Even with Morreall’s encouragement to play life as one plays music, rather than to work it, he 
still equates play with a purely aesthetic experience in which one is engaged “simply for the pleasure 
of the activity itself.”39 There are many examples of this play mode in musicians, athletes, actors, and 
playwrights. In this sense, grave, sober, solemn, etc., are antonyms of play, but, when we look at 
professional (or even amateur, in the sense of “loving” what one does) musicians, athletes, etc., we 
are not contradicting ourselves if we note such people take their play seriously. We can add to this list 
philosophers and comedians. A philosopher, e.g., who engages in thought experiment (play of ideas) 
is serious in the sense of having sufficient concern about something to take the time to think about 
it deeply. At the same time, she is not overly-emotionally engaged with the subject of study such that 
she cannot think critically about it; she is not stuck in the mode of convergent thinking in which 
unusual solutions are ignored and incongruities are only viewed as “disturbances in the practical 
order of things.”40 So, the philosopher can be serious without being in a spirit of seriousness and 
without being grave, grim, stern, and certainly not solemn or sober—a quick look at the history of 
philosophical thought experiments with evil demons, brains in vats, what it would be like to be bats, 
teletransporters, and famous violinists surreptitiously attached to one’s back, will quickly disabuse us 
from using the epithet “sober” for philosophers.41  
Likewise, a comedian, subversive wit in particular, does intend to arouse enjoyable laughter, 
but at the same time, she intends to invoke such mirth about important and thus serious matters. 
Very much like the philosopher, she engages her audience with amusing counter-factuals, possible 
worlds, and often socio-political role-reversals that convey serious information playfully. They reveal 
that playful humor does not just offer a sugar-coating to an otherwise tasteless (or distasteful) 
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medicine, but creative, critical open-mindedness that is more suited to making sense of an 
ambiguous, contingent, dynamic, and often uncertain reality.  
It is surprising that Morreall maintains this hard line between his notions of “serious” and 
“play” given his analysis of humor and freedom and his specific mention42 of the subversive feminist 
group, The Guerilla Girls, and in Soviet Russia, Krokidil,43 who clearly use humor as a means to convey 
rebellious information and effect socio-political change. However, he later undercuts the force of 
their humor: “When we want to evoke anger or outrage about some problem, we don’t present it in 
a humorous way, precisely because of the practical disengagement of humor. Satire is not a weapon of 
revolutionaries.”44 Many political spoofs are just jests employed solely for the gratification they might 
bring to an audience. Nevertheless, this is not the case for subversive humor, including the wittiness 
of many of the very individuals and groups Morreall cites.   
 
Serious Play in Subversive Humor 
 
Consider the following from Morreall: “Suppose we are talking about how General Motors [GM] 
has recently closed several factories in order to cut costs, and you say, ‘Next they’ll shut down all 
their plants, to really save some money.’”45 Morreall claims the humorous retort does not qualify as a 
locutionary act in J. L. Austin’s sense, e.g., other than being a meaningful string of words, because it 
is not meant to actually convey information, ask a question, or give a command.46 Furthermore, 
Morreall claims it is not an illocutionary act either. In such acts, one is intending to do something 
with the words uttered, in particular, to get others to act in some way. So, when one performs an 
illocutionary act, this can be a means to bring about a change of some state of affairs, or what 
amounts to a perlocutionary act. He gives the example of a child asking to borrow dad’s car, and the 
father responds with the implicit command “the gas tank is almost empty.”47 Here the illocutionary 
speech act is performed in the straightforward locutionary act which appears to be describing a state 
of affairs. But in this context, this mundane statement is understood by the child to mean something 
like “If you want to borrow the car YOU will have to fill it up with gas, perhaps out of YOUR own 
money.”  
According to Morreall, joking and amusement, non-bona-fide or insincere uses of language, 
cannot be explained through Austin’s framework. This is not surprising, as mentioned multiple 
times above, playful humor conflicts with any practical concern, including the successful 
transmission of information. This is because, while in play mode, “[a]ll that counts is whether your 
words amuse me, and it doesn’t much matter how that is done.”48 I think this misses the point of 
humor even in the everyday example Morreall chooses to make his case about humor and speech 
acts; but it especially fails to make sense of what occurs with subversive humor.   
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To return to his GM example, I might not be directly informing you about a fact regarding 
GM, but I am indirectly telling you something about the way GM affects my moral sensibilities, and 
others like me, and should affect yours. I do not intend that you believe the literal content of the 
faux-assertion, but I do convey something I think is true, at least on one reading of the joke—GM 
engages in immoral practices, or GM does not value (or care at all) for its employees. In order to 
enjoy the remark, one must be able to recognize the incongruity involved, and yet come to realize 
that what appeared nonsensical, non-illocutionary, and impractical on the superficial level, in fact 
does make sense when reinterpreted, in this case, from a (mildly) rebellious perspective: “Leaders of 
giant corporations that are too big to fail (or jail) can get away with anything; this is not as it should 
be.” This adept use of hyperbole to create a pleasing incongruity is doing more than merely 
delighting.  
In Morreall’s example where my son wants to borrow the car, I state (locutionary act) that 
the car is almost out of gas. However, I am giving more than just a description of the way the world 
is; I am in a way prescribing to my son that the car should be filled up by him. There is a similar 
underlying linguistic and psychological structure with the GM example, but with the notable 
difference in its attempt at humor. In both of these rather ordinary cases, more is being said than 
what is literally presented, and the implicit information in both can be interpreted as important—
even serious in the sense that what one is saying (in not saying it) matters.   
The subversive wit recognizes the difference between the way the world is and the way it 
should be, and is not content, contra Morreall, with “everything [being] acceptable just as it is.”49 In the 
section on intellectual and moral virtues fostered by humor, Morreall notes that since “all moral 
codes want us to transcend our ‘here/now/me’ perspective, they encourage us to avoid anger, fear, 
and other self-focused emotions.”50 It is significant that he omits “real” and “practical” from this 
list, which he had included earlier in the text.51 I think he has it right in the latter section, as neither 
morality nor humor is fully disengaged from reality and practical concern, and this is especially so 
with subversive humor. Indeed, Morreall offers many insightful examples that make this point, 
against so much of his earlier insistence that if something is truly humorous it cannot be burdened 
with practical concern, because, to the extent that it is, the experiences invoked are less aesthetic, 
less enjoyable, less focused only on the incongruity, and more concerned with somber issues that 
must be solved in an absolute, single-tracked approach.52 This is the counter-attitude to playfulness, 
not the seriousness that accompanies important, real, practical issues like oppression, for example. 
The subversive humorist is not laughing stoically against an unjust reality that is inexorable no 
matter what one does--this is the spirit of seriousness. Rather, she is laughing at incongruities 
between reality and the way she thinks it should (and could) be. Diminishing this possibility 
unnecessarily shuts off potential avenues for non-violent protest against injustice within a system, 
such as subtle racism and implicit biases, which cannot be amended in more direct, legal, or 
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economic ways. As Iris Young rightly notes, we cannot legislate against joking any more than we can 
successfully proscribe racist or sexist attitudes through the court system.53 
Finally, I will address some of the examples Morreall uses to defend the claim that humor 
fosters open-mindedness, multiple perspectives, and makes us “not only more tolerant of people’s 
differences, but more gracious.”54 Here is the first:  
 
Consider how Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater became a member of the Phoenix 
Country Club in the 1960’s. Because his father was Jewish, the club initially rejected 
his application. Instead of getting angry or filing a lawsuit, Goldwater called the club 
president to ask a question. ‘Since I’m only half-Jewish, can I join if I just play nine 
holes?’ The man laughed heartily and immediately let him in. Goldwater’s humor has 
gently opened his eyes to the absurdity of the club’s anti-Semitism and had given him 
an easy way to change its policy.55 
 
Morreall does not tell us whether the policy was changed only for Goldwater or for all—a significant 
point. However, even if this worked only in the individual case, it does illustrate how one can be in 
play mode, use incongruity (“the absurdity of anti-Semitism”) humorously in order to elicit play 
mode in the listener, and invoke a change, even if minor, in an oppressive system. The question for 
Morreall here is whether this instance is no longer funny because it has as an additional goal, the 
practical intent to alter a part of social reality that Goldwater wishes were not the case. If the quip is 
still amusing, and it is as effective as Morreall contends, then this stands as an example of subversive 
humor in which a playful attitude is used to not only highlight, but amend a serious/important and 
practical situation. 56 This stands as an attack of the spirit of seriousness, in this case, explicitly 
mandated by the bigoted country club—that is, Goldwater is using humor to address a contingent 
state of affairs constructed by the mystifications of the serious.57    
In another case, Morreall contends “[l]ives have been saved by humor… A few years before 
coming President, Lincoln was challenged to a duel. He agreed, provided that he could specify the 
weapons and the distance at which they would stand. The other gentleman agreed.  Lincoln said, 
‘Cow shit at five paces.’ And that was the end of the argument.” Little needs to be said about the 
seriousness involved with a situation in which death is highly probable; Lincoln was apparently inept 
at both swords and firearms. Happily for him, he did have a sense of humor; a fact duly noted and 
adopted by his potential dueler. The third example comes from his section entitled “Humor during 
the Holocaust.” In fact, there are many examples I could pick out from this section which illustrate 
the point I wish to make regarding the efficacy of subversive humor in which the wit is in play 
mode, and is taking a matter seriously in the sense that he wishes his situation were not as it is, and is 
acting through humor to change it. Jewish prisoners in ghettos or camps, for example, recognize the 
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incongruities in the absurdity of the Nazi regime and through humor are benefitted in three ways, 
according to Morreall: “humor focused attention on what was wrong and sparked resistance to it. 
Second was its cohesive function: it created solidarity in those laughing together at their oppressors. 
And third was its coping function: it helped the oppressed get through their suffering without going 
insane.”58 There is both cognitive and emotional distance here, but it is not the sort envisioned by 
Morreall, for if it were, such humor would have been a boon only in his second and third ways, 
which is not nothing, of course. The first benefit of humor requires some kind of practical 
engagement, likely one that is both emotional and cognitive. 
I will end with an example provided by Morreall that illustrates at least these three benefits 
of humor, in this case used against overt oppression:   
 
Goebbels was touring German schools. At one, he asked the students to call out 
patriotic slogans. “Heil Hitler,” shouted one child. “Very good,” said Goebbels. 
“Deutschland über alles,” another called out. “Excellent. How about a stronger 
slogan?” A hand shot up, and Goebbels nodded. “Our people shall live forever,” the 
little boy said. “Wonderful,” exclaimed Goebbels. “What is your name, young man?” 
“Israel Goldberg.”59 
 
This example, and others, disconfirms Morreall’s claims regarding the degree of disengagement in 
humor as such: “We are in a play mode rather than a serious mode, disengaged from conceptual and 
practical concerns.”60 But here we can see the ambiguity of “playfulness” and “seriousness.” Who is 
wholly disengaged in this example? Is it the Jewish boy who creates the humor? Is he so 
unemotional in this case that he is only concerned with creating an aesthetic experience? Is he so 
emotionally involved that he cannot succeed in such a creation? I would argue that he, like other 
subversive humorists from Frederick Douglass to Richard Pryor, to Chris Rock and Dave 
Chappelle, are in play mode when they make humorous socio-political commentary—but they are 
also (non-existentially) serious in much the same way a musician seriously plays her instrument, as an 
athlete seriously plays her sport, as a philosopher seriously plays with thought (experiments), and as a 
comedian seriously plays with humor. 
By assuming a framework in which everything fits perfectly we habituate ourselves toward a 
spirit of seriousness. That is, we incline ourselves to an unquestioning attitude, one that presumes a 
hermetic seal between our (pre)conceptions and perceptions. Morreall notes that an omniscient 
being would not (could not) have a sense of humor as there would be nothing unexpected; no 
violations of patterns or conceptual frameworks.61 By analogy (and it can only be that), the person 
habituated in a spirit of seriousness is epistemically closed not due to actual omniscience, but a 
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presumption of certainty within a particular domain that does not admit of surprise. Put differently, 
one has fostered a disposition to ignore any unwanted incongruities. 
So with injustice, e.g., the subversive wit is not just puzzled by incongruity such that she 
attempts to only amend her attitude and perspective toward it as if she were merely confronted with 
a riddle; nor is she solely constrained within a negative attitude such that her thoughts are 
convergent, single-tracked, irrational, existentially and Morreall-serious. Rather, with subversive 
humor, there is the third element, humorous amusement, which allows for the subversive wit to 
transcend (without denying or fictionalizing) the emotional seriousness through entering play mode, 
linger with the puzzling incongruity, and find the matter important/serious enough to do something 
creative about it. Playfulness implies freedom of thought in which rules and hierarchies are viewed 
as contingent and malleable rather than necessary and inviolate, as assumed under a spirit of 
seriousness. The subversive humorist relies upon a playful attitude in her audience, but she also can 
help to facilitate such an attitude through the use of humor. When one is playful, one is open to 
others in ways not available in the default serious mode; meanings are not absolute and fixed, but 
contingent, as are the hierarchical, serious, oppressive structures resisted by the playful subversive 
humorist who recognize and exploit incongruities or gaps between our professed ideals and the way 
the world actually is. Analyzing the ambiguities between seriousness and playfulness and their 
relation to humor can provide fertile ground for further investigations in to the practical means of 
protest through humor. 
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